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| This paper seeks an explanation for the resilience of the Syrian authoritarian regime under Hafez and Bashar Al-Asad. It will be argued that this resilience is to a relevant extent caused by the fact that the regime's "material" as well as "ideational" forms of power share a common element if not an underlying principle. This generates their compatibility and congruency and thus produces a convergence of forces which manifests in the regime's ability to exceed the mere sum of its individual forms of power. It will be demonstrated that this common principle can be conceptualized as a "tacit pact" between unequal parties with the weaker party under constant threat of exclusion and/or coercion in the event of noncompliance. It will be argued that inherent in the pact is a high level of ambiguity; this paradoxically renders it more effective but at the same time also more instable as a tool of domination. | |
| This paper seeks an explanation for the resilience of the Syrian authoritarian regime under Hafez and Bashar Al-Asad. It will be argued that this resilience is to a relevant extent caused by the fact that the regime’s "material" as well as "ideational" forms of power share a common el ement if not an underlying principle. This generates their compatibility and congruency and thus produces a convergence of forces which manifests in the regime’s ability to exceed the mere sum of its individual forms of power. It will be demonstrated that this common principle can be conceptualized as a "tacit pact" between unequal parties with the weaker party under constant threat of exclusion and/or coercion in the event of noncompliance. It will be argued that inherent in the pact is a high level of ambiguity; this paradoxically renders it more effective but at the same time also more instable as a tool of domination. (GIGA) |
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